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The last twenty years have witnessed the introduction of a remarkable number of innovations in corporate
securities.1Most of these have been brought about by investment banks through the business of underwriting
new corporate issues. It is also remarkable that investment banks have found it pro…table to develop new
securities even when their competitors have been able to imitate them almost immediately and at signi…cantly
smaller development costs. The empirical evidence so far has suggested that, despite these disadvantages,
innovators are compensated with the largest share of the underwriting market. In this paper I estimate the
demand of …rms for the underwriting services of investment banks that use innovative corporate products.
This will allow me to measure the di¤erent value to …rms from raising money using a security engineered by
an innovator or an imitator and thus explain part of the innovator’s market share advantage. The dynamic
setup of the econometric model will allow a characterization of this advantage over time and shed light on
the question of what makes innovators have a demand advantage over imitators.
Product innovation in …nance is particularly interesting because innovators face many disadvantages.
Tufano (1989) provides evidence showing that imitation occurs shortly after the …rst issue of a new security,
leaving virtually no time for innovators to be the sole underwriters for that new product. He also observes
that the development cost is signi…cantly smaller for imitators than for innovators. Further, the design of
new securities is rapidly revealed to competing banks because of SEC rules of disclosure. Most strikingly,
imitation cannot be precluded by any form of legal protection, e.g., patents.
In his seminal contribution, Tufano (1989) observes that what compensates innovators for these disad-
vantages is the largest share of the market for underwriting corporate new issues: given a security, the bank
that creates it is able to underwrite more capital than its largest imitator over all the security’s history. Why
innovators are able to have such an unchallenged lead in these markets is perhaps the …rst question that this
evidence raises. This paper takes a …rst step towards answering the question empirically. For that purpose I
model the choice of a …rm that needs to raise money externally through the issue of a security. This …rm has
to choose the type of security to be used and the bank that will underwrite it. Aggregating the choices of all
the …rms that need to make an o¤ering, the model predicts the market shares of underwriting by di¤erent
banks using di¤erent securities, conditional, among other things, on the characteristics of the banks (e.g., if
they are imitators or innovators). Thus, after estimating this model, we can test whether innovators have
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an advantage because their security is more valuable to the issuers.
This paper introduces two features that allow us to get a better description of the facts of …nancial
innovation. One of them is the use of a framework of di¤erentiated products to model and estimate the
demand for underwriting services. An inspection of recent innovations in corporate products suggests clearly
that di¤erent securities are created to target di¤erent types of issuers or investors. For example, two similar
debt products that tie the repayment of the principal to the performance of other indices provide di¤erent
hedging devices to investors: the Stock Market Annual Reset Term Notes (SMARTs) are corporate bonds
that pay a capped ‡oating rate that is tied to the American Stock Exchange Oil Stocks Index while the
Currency Protected Notes (CPNs) are bonds that pay a ‡oating rate that is inversely tied to the Canadian
six-month bankers acceptance rate. By taking into account the location of securities in a product space, it is
possible to identify consistently a demand function for underwriting that depends on the price of underwriting
(the underwriting spread).2This is possible because we can associate the variation in market shares with the
variation in underwriting spreads of varieties of the same security by di¤erent banks, and the variation in
underwriting spreads of similar varieties which can be close substitutes.3
The other feature is that this study focuses also on the dynamic pattern of market shares. Instead
of comparing the market shares of innovators and imitators over the whole history of a given innovation, I
observe them over time and estimate the innovator’s demand advantage accordingly. This will reveal whether
the innovator’s advantage is preserved steadily through the life cycle of the security or if imitators catch
up with (or continue to fall behind) innovators. This dynamic setup also allows a comparison between the
demands for sequences of securities. In fact, most securities appear sequentially, later ones as improvements
of earlier ones. It appears that the life cycle of a security ends when an innovation that modi…es the older
design is introduced.
The empirical …nance literature has not yet addressed extensively the question of why innovators have
advantages over imitators. In fact, most authors have examined extensively the causes of the demand
for innovative securities. The focus has been on trying to explain what made each particular innovation
attractive to investors or issuers but not on why it is privately pro…table to develop such instruments. Miller
(1986), for example, argues that the major impulse to …nancial innovations between the sixties and the
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eighties came from ever changing tax codes and regulations that brought about pro…t opportunities (e.g.,
tax money saved) through the design of new …nancial products that circumvented these laws.4
Not much work has been done, though, to try to solve the puzzle of why an unpatentable innovation is
worth its R&D expenditure if imitation is less costly and immediate. In particular, not much has been said
about what gives innovators an advantage over imitators. On one hand, some authors have tried to explain
Tufano’s stylized facts at the theoretical level by arguing that innovators are infra-marginal competitors,
i.e., that have lower marginal costs than imitators. By moving …rst, innovators may face lower search costs
of identifying potential issuers and investors (Allen and Gale, 1994, Chapter 4) or lower average marketing
costs if there is lumpiness in the set up costs of marketing networks (Ross, 1989) or if innovation signals
skill and creativity credibly (Tufano, 1989). On the other hand, Battacharyya and Nanda (2000) provide
a model in which the innovator is able to appropriate the value of its innovation and pro…t from it despite
being imitated if it is costly for its clients to switch to other underwriters.5 ;6
By contrast with these views, I analyze the possibility that the asymmetry between innovators and
imitators is on the information owned by these two types of banks about the product. If some of the
information that innovators have about the security remains private, a larger proportion of the R&D value
added can be appropriated. In other words, the innovator can pro…t because it is imitated imperfectly.
This possibility was explored in a theoretical paper by Herrera and Schroth (2000). In it, innovators of
derivatives that move one period in advance receive private informative signals from their clients or the
market. This allows them to o¤er deals that are more attractive to …rms than what imitators can o¤er. For
recent innovations in corporate securities, it is possible that imitation is imperfect. Equity-Linked securities
and other derivative corporate products are sophisticated securities, speci…ed by many parameters, some
of which vary from deal to deal. Thus, it is possible that imitators cannot reverse-engineer perfectly the
observed new securities from only a few deals. For example, the Equity-Linked Note (ELK) was the …rst
debt product to tie the repayment of principal to the stock price of another publicly traded company. The
optimal choice of which stock to tie the notes to is observable but the knowledge of what stocks are optimal
for di¤erent issuers or investors is a private component of R&D. Imitators that want to underwrite issues of
ELKs for a potential client may know how to structure such instruments, but may not know exactly, from
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what is observable, what stock to choose to tie the repayment of the debt of their client.
Using data on all the new issues of equity-linked and corporate derivative securities, the (qualitative)
results of the estimation of the demand for underwriting services can be summarized as follows:
² the demand for underwriting services using this type of securities is sensitive to the underwriting spread
(i.e., its price);
² on average, the issuers’ demand for the underwriting service by an innovator using its own variety of
the security is bigger than the demand for an underwriter that uses an imitative variety;
² this di¤erence disappears during the security’s life cycle, so imitators catch up with innovators;
² imitators catch up with innovators faster if securities are later improvements on past innovations.
Thus, this paper provides the …rst empirical test that the advantage to innovators may come from a
bigger demand for the innovators’ products. The dynamic patterns of competition it identi…es are consistent
with the predictions of Van Horne (1985) when imitators enter the market.7They are also consistent with
the hypothesis that the advantage to innovators is superior information that allows them to engineer their
securities better than imitators.
In the next section of the paper I describe the data set I use and present some preliminary results that
motivate the assumptions of the demand model I estimate. In Section 2 I develop the model that will allow
me to characterize the decision of …rms about the di¤erent types of underwriters (innovators and imitators).
First I present the formal setup for the discrete-choice decision problem of …rms. I show that …rms should
derive additional value if they chose an innovator rather than imitators as their underwriter. Then I explain
how this conjecture will be tested using multinomial logit and nested logit models of demand. In Section 3
I present the results of the estimation and Section 4 summarizes the main claims of the paper.
1 Some Preliminary Evidence
The data used in this research is obtained from the Securities Data Company’s on-line databases of …nancial
transactions. I use all the private and public o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative corporate securities
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in the New Issues database and record as many details of the o¤er as possible: the name of the issuer, the
principal issued, the name of the underwriter, the underwriter’s fees (underwriting spread), and details of
the security, like o¤ered yield to maturity, average life, spread of coupon over treasury notes, call options,
etc. I merge this data set with the quarterly COMPUSTAT database (using six digit CUSIP numbers) to
have …nancial information about the issuer.
In his study, Tufano (1989) uses all types of securities between 1974 and 1986. Here I restrict the sample
to equity-linked securities because this type …ts better the motivation that …rst-mover advantages come
from information asymmetries between underwriters. This type of securities are complex and underwriters
have to choose many parameters to engineer such deals (In Table 1 I show the relative size of this market).
Variations on mortgage backed products, for example, may be already too familiar to investment banks to
hide something in their structure to imitators.
The …rst thing to realize about Equity-Linked and Derivative Securities is that they can be classi…ed
into groups. The SDC database identi…es 50 di¤erent types of them but a closer look indicates that some of
these securities are related to each other in terms of their structure and purpose. For example, MIPS and
TOPRS are instruments used by issuers to deduct debt interest payments from their taxable income, but the
former are issued by a limited liability company while the latter by a specially conformed business trust.8To
classify all the 50 corporate products in the SDC database I have relied on the experts’ opinion about the
uses of these products for corporations and investors.9 I found ten distinct categories, which I summarize
in Table 2. For the rest of the paper I will refer to these categories as “groups” or “families” of securities
interchangeably.
I will refer to each one of these securities as an innovation, since for each one there is a unique feature
that distinguishes it from everything that already existed. However, depending on the group they are in and
the order in which they appeared, I will assign to each security a generation number. For example, since
MIPS were the …rst tax advantage preferred note, I will call them the …rst generation of this family, and
TOPRS the fourth.
I follow Tufano’s (1989) criterion to de…ne the innovator of a security as the underwriter of its …rst o¤er.
Similar to what Tufano found, for equity-linked corporate securities we do observe that innovators have an
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edge over imitators in terms of market shares. 18 of the 50 products are imitated. In 13 of these, innovators
lead in principal underwritten, and in 15 they lead in number of new issues. Also, imitation was fast: for 10
of these securities, the second underwriting deal was made by an imitator (see Table 3).
In this paper I want to study why innovators have a competitive advantage over imitators. In particular,
I want to test if issuers have stronger preferences for innovators than imitators as the underwriter of the
o¤er. To choose an appropriate framework to study the demand for the underwriter of the issue it is worth
examining the dynamics of the market for a new issue within each security and within each family. In Figures
1 and 2 I show the total quarterly principal underwritten by investment banks using the most important
securities of two families. As we can see, each security seems to be popular for a certain period of time until
a next generation appears and leads the market for issues of that group.
Another interesting feature for some families is that the market share advantage of innovators over
imitators seems to be bigger in the early generations. In …gures 3 through 5 I show the evolution in time
of the accumulated underwritten principal using a given security. Each …gure represents a generation of the
same family (convertible preferred stocks). For later generations, imitators end up accumulating a larger
principal relative to the innovator. In some cases the innovator is overtaken. A similar feature is observed
in the family of index-tied principal appreciation securities (…gures 6 and 7). It is less clear, though, if
this is true for other families, like the tax-advantage debt or equity products. On average, still it seems
the innovators’s advantage is weaker on late generations: Table 4 shows the average ratios of principal
underwritten by imitators relative to principal underwritten by innovators. The ratio for …rst generation
securities is half the ratio that includes all imitated securities.
The evidence above suggests that innovators seem to have an advantage over imitators that is stronger
for earlier generations of securities within the family. Further inspection suggests that the appropriate
framework to analyze the securities in this sample may be one of di¤erentiated products: it is clear from the
de…nition of the 50 securities that these corporate products o¤er di¤erent bene…ts to issuers or investors.
Some provide a tax-advantage, others provide a hedge against the risk of defaulting on debt. Interestingly,
within imitated securities there seems to be di¤erentiation across underwriters. For example, the within-
variety variation for some of these characteristics is smaller for imitators than for the innovator (Table 5).
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The price of underwriting, i.e., the underwriting spread, does not seem to di¤er signi…cantly, although the
within security sample mean of the underwriting fee for innovators is larger than for imitators (Table 6).
I will interpret this evidence as I present the econometric model and as I discuss the results of the
econometric estimation. What I conclude from this evidence is that a useful model to describe competition
between investment banks to underwrite corporate issues using this type of securities must be one of product
di¤erentiation in an oligopolistic industry. Di¤erentiation occurs at the underwriters level, where innovators
are distinguished from their imitators. Thus, from now on I will call a variety a distinct combination of a
security and an underwriter.
2 The Demand Model
2.1 The Theoretical Approach
The model I present below is built to illustrate the decision making process of …rms that want to raise
capital and have to choose an appropriate security and the best underwriter, that is, the investment bank or
“book-manager” that will engineer the security and sell it. I will use a stylized model of …rms’ preferences
and underwriters’ information to …nd the demand for underwriting services by the di¤erent banks using their
variety. The objective is to motivate a reduced form that can then be taken to the data and will allow us
to test if those underwriters that invented the security have an advantage over the other underwriters that
engineered the same security for their clients (the imitators). In particular, the model shows that …rms will
place a higher value to underwriting deals made with innovators than imitators.
It is worth to point out that the ultimate source of the innovator’s advantage, the information asymmetry,
is taken as given in this paper. The model that follows illustrates how the asymmetry is built into the demand
function and what would be the empirical implications.10
2.1.1 The Setup
Firms that want to raise capital, the issuers, demand underwriting services from investment banks. These
banks compete to underwrite the issue of a corporate security, and for this they o¤er di¤erentiated products:
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debt or equity types of deals that o¤er investors di¤erent payo¤ schedules, horizons, call options, convert-
ibility possibilities, etc. Thus, they compete for issuers that could use a non-standard variety of …nancial
instruments.
A …rm that needs to issue a security to raise capital is indexed by i 2 I: At a given period, there is a
set of varieties of instruments, J =f1; 2; :::; Jg from which it can choose one. Let g be an index for groups
of varieties, g = 1; :::; G; such that G · J and let there be a partition G =fJ1;J2; :::;JGg of J so that each
set Jg contains those varieties which are closer to each other in terms of their characteristics. In this setup,
for example, if consumers were choosing models and brands of a car then a set Jg would contain all brands
of, say, Sport Utility Vehicles and some other set, Jh; would contain all brands of compact models.
In our case, the groups in G are securities that have the same name, e.g., PERCS, LYONS or TOPRS
and each variety would be determined by the name of the bank that underwrote the issue, e.g., PERCS by
Morgan Stanley or PERCS by Merrill Lynch.11Let b represent an underwriter in the set of banks, B.
The …rm chooses one security and one underwriter among those that o¤er that security. A variety j 2 J
is given by a unique (b; g) combination. Let uij be the value to …rm i of choosing the variety, j: The setup
for this decision is illustrated in Figure 8.
The value function uij is central to this paper since it is the function whose parameters I will estimate
using the data. I will characterize this function when I derive the preferences of issuers for underwriters that
are innovators and underwriters that are imitators. The empirical literature that deals with the estimation
of preference parameters in models of discrete choice uses special cases of the general speci…cations of linear
preferences by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991) or Anderson et. al. (1989). In these studies, agents value a
product according to a weighted sum of its components. These components, in general, are functions of the
observable characteristics of the product. We shall see, below, how this structure is particularly appropriate
for this study.
2.1.2 Preferences of Firms
In a typical underwriting deal of equity-linked or derivative corporate securities the …rm will issue a security
engineered by the underwriter. The …rm has preferences over the set of possible structures for that security.
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An underwriting deal is de…ned by a combination of a vector of characteristics and an underwriting fee.
If µ 2 £ is this vector, and p the fee, then an underwriting deal between a bank b and a …rm i is fully
characterized by fj; i; µ; pg:
The vector of characteristics could include, for example, the premium over dividend paid by common
stock, the date of maturity of the security, the number of periods this security is protected from a call option
by the issuer, or, more broadly, discrete variables that determine whether the security is convertible or not,
if it is convertible to common stock or debt, etc.
Let us start with a general random value function for the i¡th …rm in a given period, t. If a …rm chooses
some variety j its value depends on how the security has been engineered, i.e., on µj; and its “net income”
after the fee is paid. Let this value function be denoted by
uijt = u(yit ¡ pjt; µjt ; ²t)+"ijt : (1)
As shown by McFadden (1981), this function is continuous in y¡p and µ and twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable in the same arguments provided that the function is continuous and twice continuously di¤erentiable
in other goods and in µ:
²t is assumed to be an observable economy-wide shock that varies in time and changes the preferences
temporarily. It can be thought of as, for example, a sudden urge for cash or a period of unusual underpricing
of new issues. The term "ijt is assumed to be an additive random component that captures the random
preferences of a given …rm for a particular variety. It is unobservable to underwriters, and distributed
independently with a continuously di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function, G("):
2.1.3 Underwriters
At each period underwriters engineer and price their own varieties of securities such that they maximize
their pro…ts. I assume that underwriters are Bertrand-Nash competitors in prices and µ. Their pro…ts are
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given by
¼jt = pjtqjt ¡ c(qjt); (2)
where the demand for the particular variety j is
qjt = q(pt ; µt ; ²t) = Mt
Z
Aj(u)
dG("); (3)
and c(:) is the total cost, such that c0(:) ¸ 0: The demand for a particular variety is a function of the prices
of all varieties the vector µ; and the observable economy-wide shocks. The set Ajt(u) is the set of all the
possible realizations of the individual shocks, ("i1t; :::; "iJ t); such that uijt > uikt; k 6= j; i.e., the set of all
the states that lead an issuer to a choice of variety j: M is a measure of the total number of …rms, so that
qj is obtained by multiplying M by the share of …rms that choose j of the total number of …rms that want
to raise capital.
The next proposition will simplify our work signi…cantly. It shows that an underwriter’s choice of µjt
that maximizes each …rm’s individual utility conditional on its available information also maximizes the
underwriter’s pro…ts. I assume that u(:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave.
Proposition 1 For a given shock ²t and a price pjt; if µ
¤
jtmaximizes uijt(yit¡pjt; µjt ;²t ;"ijt ; :) then µ
¤
jtmaximizes
¼jt :
I prove this proposition in the appendix, but the intuition is very simple. Since the unobservable compo-
nent of utility is independent of the characteristics of the security and consumers taste shocks are independent,
then the aggregate demand for a variety j is strictly increasing in the utility of any issuer. I have derived this
result now because it allows me to eliminate µjt from the issuers’ value function, by substituting the optimal
choice of µjt: The objective in the next section is to explain how that choice di¤ers across underwriters with
di¤erent information sets and, as a consequence, how the value of …rms di¤ers depending on the chosen
underwriter.12
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2.1.4 Asymmetric Information
The crucial feature that distinguishes an innovator from an imitator in this paper is that innovators exploit
an informational asymmetry and are able to sign the largest share of …rms using the security they invented
while sustaining rents in equilibrium. In this paper I do not provide a model that explains why moving …rst
gives the innovator an advantage, as Herrera and Schroth (2000) do. Instead, I take as given that innovators
will possess an advantage over imitators and formalize it in this theory section to derive a the reduced form
that will be taken to the data.
Let £0 2 £ be the prior (common) knowledge set of all the possible characteristics that a security can
have, and uijt the utility function in (1), which is also common knowledge to all underwriters at some point
in time. To relate this abstraction to the case of equity-linked or derivative securities, imagine £0 as a
set of all possible engineering choices for a security before convertible debt was invented. Before the …rst
innovation, debt securities would be zero coupon or would have paid a …xed or a ‡oating rate, so any vector
in £0 would have zero entries for other characteristics yet to be used, e.g., for convertibility to common
stock.
If an underwriter spends resources on R&D to come up with a new security, it will discover new possible
combinations of characteristics a …rm may …nd valuable, possibly changing zero entries to add new dimensions
to the structure of a security. The PERC, for example, was the …rst issue of preferred stock convertible to
common stock with capped and ‡oored appreciation. This new set of possible engineering choices must be
tied to the discovery of …rms’s preferences for some previously non-existent feature of a security. In the case
of the PERC, its innovator, Morgan Stanley, …gured out that in the uncertain environment for investment
in late 1991, an issue of a PERC would allow …rms to attract investors with stable high yields, pricing the
o¤er better than common stock while capping the security’s appreciation potential (Pratt, 1991).
De…nition 1 An innovation is a new security g; tied to two private discoveries:
(i) a set £g ½ £ such that £g ¡£0 6= fÁg; and
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(ii) a decomposition of unobservable preferences for a variety k of g
"ik = "(µk; ²; :) + e"ik:
Based on this de…nition, after an investment bank invests on R&D it discovers some systematic com-
ponent, "(:); in the previously random term of any issuers’ preferences, ". This component depends on
the engineering of the security, µ; and on a time-variant economy-wide shock,². This component of utility
can also depend on new attributes of the µ vector, i.e., it can be de…ned for newer features of a security,
that previously had a zero entry (e.g., convertibility of preferred stock, stock portfolio-tied appreciation of
principal, etc.). Thus, the innovator also enlarges its set of possible choices for µ.
Example 1 The Equity-Linked Security or ELK was the …rst debt product to tie the repayment of principal
to the stock price of another publicly traded company. Based on our de…nition:
(i) the set of choices is now expanded with all the possible …rms that can be chosen to tie their stock price
to the repayment of principal, and
(ii) the discovered component "(µk ; ²; :) would be a function of how issuers’ cash ‡ows are correlated with
each …rm whose stock price could be chosen to be tied to the repayment of principal.
When the …rst underwriting deal is made using a new security the innovator reveals a particular vector
µ: The whole set of possible engineering choices for this particular security, £g is kept private, though.
The goal now is to show that the optimal choices of µ for innovators and imitators will di¤er, in general,
and this will be re‡ected in the value function of a …rm signing an underwriting deal with either. Proposition
1 allows me to eliminate the vector µ of the said function and express the indirect utility as a function of
the bank’s identity. To see this, note that what distinguishes an innovator from an imitator is the set from
which it can choose any µ: For the innovator, this set is £0[ £g; and for the imitator this set is £0 [ µk:
Thus, we can summarize the identity of an investment banks by b = 1 if the banker is the innovator of the
given security, and b = 0 if not.
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Proposition 2 Let v(yi ¡ p; b; ²) ´µ 2 £
bmax u(yi ¡ p; µ; ²): For any couple of varieties j; l of the same
security g; if j is issued by an innovator then vj (yi ¡ p; 1;²)¸vl(yi ¡ p; 0;²).
The result is trivial. £1g is the set of choices of the innovator and £
0
g is the set of choices of the
representative imitator. Since £0g µ £
1
g ; the result follows.
The Proposition above has established that given prices and economy-wide shocks, innovators have an
advantage over imitators. This advantage can be measured by the additional value to issuers if they were to
choose an innovators’ variety. Let this di¤erence be named
¢vj ´ v(yi ¡ p; 1;²)¡v(yi ¡ p; 0;²): (4)
Note the importance of the time-variant shock. It provides the source of variation that makes the optimal
choice of µ; for a given security, change. This is crucial, because otherwise the revelation of µ in the …rst
deal would su¢ce to make innovators and imitators identical in terms of their information. Note too that
an underwriting deal can be de…ned in a simpler way: now it can be summarized by fj; i; b; pg:
This result is convenient for the estimation because what I want to capture is exactly the di¤erence
in preferences for the di¤erent underwriters. Also, working with a value function, in which µ has been
eliminated, avoids losing a large proportion of observations for which the full µ is not available. In other
words, my interest is to distinguish preferences for these two types of banks more than to estimate the
marginal valuation (and the derived elasticities) for a given characteristic of a security, e.g., years of call
protection, yield advantage, etc.
Another reason is that preferences for the choices of each attribute in µ may be complicated functions
that make the estimation di¢cult. Thus, using a simpler function that summarizes all the attributes seems
reasonable. This approach has been used by Caplin and Nalebu¤ (1991), who use a utility function that
is linear in functions that map the dimensions of the product characteristics onto a di¤erent space. Using
their own example, the bene…ts of a car could include only comfort and speed, but these could be more
complicated functions of the physical attributes of the car.
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2.1.5 Market Shares in Equilibrium
Here I discuss what Proposition 2 implies for the equilibrium in the market for underwriting. In this type
of setup with di¤erentiated products, there is a demand function for each variety. The next proposition
establishes that, ceteris paribus, the demand for an innovator’s variety of a given security is bigger than the
demand for an imitator’s variety of the same product.
Proposition 3 Proposition 2 implies that for two varieties j; k of the same security g and for a …xed vector
of underwriting spreads, pt 2 R
J
+ such that pjt = pkt then
qjt(pt ; :) ¸qkt(pt; :)
if j is the innovator’s variety.
I prove this proposition in the appendix. Note that if ¢vjt > 0 then the proposition above holds with a
strict inequality.
I will not show formally that in equilibrium innovators have bigger within-securities market shares than
imitators. In fact, it is not obvious that this will be the equilibrium outcome. It is true though that, under
mild regularity conditions on G(:) and v(:), the game becomes one of strategic complementarity.13Moreover,
if the best response function of the innovator “shifts right” if his advantage is positive, i.e., if ¢v > 0; and
if marginal costs are the same among underwriters then in equilibrium the innovator will charge a larger
underwriting spread for his variety of the same security higher and have a larger market share within that
security. If this advantage eventually decreases, then the innovator’s equilibrium price should decrease and
converge to a symmetric equilibrium as the advantage goes to zero.1 4
2.2 The Econometric Model
I argued above that the market of underwriting new issues using equity-linked securities and other corporate
derivatives may be well approached as one of di¤erentiated products. Each variety o¤ered is given by a
combination of a security structure or name and the identity of an underwriter. In this section I present
the model that I take to the data. This model will be a reduced form equation obtained from aggregating
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the individual …rms’ demands for the di¤erent varieties. I establish di¤erent sets of assumptions for the
aggregation of individual …rm demands, and the results will be di¤erent reduced forms to estimate: the
multinomial logit and the nested logit demand models, each one requiring a di¤erent method of estimation.
2.2.1 The General Setup
I consider each time period t = 1; :::; T a di¤erent market in which an issuer i chooses its desired variety
j: As the standard of the empirical literature of discrete models of demand, I will specify the value of this
issuer as a function of observed and unobserved characteristics of the issuer and of the product o¤ered by
the underwriter, and of the relevant parameters. Let
uijt = ®(yit ¡ pjt) + xjt¯ + » jt + "ijt: (5)
The …rst term on the right are the net proceeds of the issue, which are assumed to be separable and
linear.15
The second term captures the indicators that distinguish an innovator from an imitator. The vector xjt
is then an index of ¢vj that will include all the variables that re‡ect di¤erences in the information owned
by underwriters. As we shall see below, I will not only employ dummy variables that capture the preference
…rms have, on average for investment banks with superior information. I will also try to identify the dynamics
of this advantage by interacting the identity of banks with the number of time periods after the security has
been imitated, and the order in which the security appears within its “family”. I will also account for the
fact that banks may acquire reputation as experienced underwriters of this type of securities based on their
history as innovators within a family or any other type of equity-linked or derivative corporate security.
The value of choosing alternative j to raise capital can be decomposed into its mean, ±jt = ¡®pjt +
xjt¯ + »jt and a deviation from it, ®yit + "ijt : The unobservable (to the econometrician) characteristics of
the security j itself are captured by » j; while the deviation term is used to account for the heterogeneity of
…rms preferences. "ijt would be a purely idiosyncratic, mean zero, shock. Below I will explain brie‡y the
di¤erent ways I will estimate the parameters of the value function.
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2.2.2 Logit Demand
Berry (1994) shows that if we under some distributional assumptions about "ijt we can identify the pa-
rameters of (5) using the observed market shares of all varieties, j: In particular, assuming that "ijt has a
density function f (") = exp(¡ exp(¡")) the market shares predicted by the model, bsjt ; which are obtained
by integrating all the realizations of unobservables that lead to a choice of j over all other varieties, are given
by the well-known closed form solution (the logit formula):
bsjt(± t) = e±jt
1 +
PJ
l=1 e
±lt
: (6)
Note that the average utility of the outside alternative is normalized to zero (±0t = 0) and that the term
®yit drops out because it is common to all the choices. The logit formula has the property that the market
shares are uniquely pinned down by the average utility of a choice j: Thus, ® and ¯ can be obtained from
a regression of the di¤erence of the logarithms of the observed market share of j and an outside alternative,
on xjt and pjt ; e.g.:
ln sjt ¡ lns0t = ¡®pjt + xjt¯ + »jt : (7)
The estimation of this model is simple. The challenge is to …nd appropriate instruments for the price
because it is very likely that it is correlated with the unobservables, » jt : This is a typical problem found
in studies that use product characteristics as regressors. In this case, xjt uses issuers’ characteristics that
summarize the full description of the product, so it is less likely that »jt contains product unobservables
correlated with the price.
There may still be other costs of imposing this particularly convenient structure. As a consequence of
assuming that the "ijt are independent and homoskedastic, the odds ratios of choosing one variety over
another do not depend on the value of other varieties. This can be problematic: suppose the demand for
MIPS were evenly split between Goldman, Sachs and Merrill Lynch, and each were half the demand for
Salomon Brother’s ELKS. This model would predict that the ratio of the market share of Goldman’s MIPS
to Salomon’s ELKS would still be one half, even if Merrill increases its underwriting fee by any magnitude.
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Implicitly, the business lost by Merrill Lynch would be absorbed by both Goldman and Salomon so as to
preserve the ratio, never mind that Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch o¤er close varieties and Salomon
o¤ers a di¤erent product.
2.2.3 Nested Logit
The nested logit allows a richer pattern of substitution than the simple logit and at a small additional
computational cost. The decision to choose a variety is now represented by a tree as in Figure 8. The
preferences of …rms are allowed to be correlated within groups. In this case, di¤erent varieties of the same
securities o¤ered by di¤erent investment banks would be closer substitutes of each other than any other
security.
In this case, the utility of a given choice, j; can be modelled as a restricted version of (5), allowing for
random coe¢cients, ³ig; on security speci…c dummies. Thus, we have
uijt = ±jt +
X
g
djg³ ig + (1 ¡ ¾)"ijt ; (8)
where djg = 1 if j 2 Jg ; and "ijt is still assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a Weibull
distribution.
If the random coe¢cients are also assumed to be drawn from a Weibull distribution, then so is the term
³+(1¡¾)": The degree of within group correlation is given by ¾ : if it approaches one then so does the within
security correlation of utility levels, and if it approaches zero then there is no within security correlation
and we are back to the logit model. Due to this assumption there is an analytical solution for the predicted
market shares of underwriters within the security:
bsj=gt(± t; ¾) = e±jt=1¡¾
Dgt
; (9)
Dgt =
X
h2Jg
e±ht=1¡¾: (10)
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The overall market share is
bsjt(±t ; ¾) = e±jt=1¡¾
D¾gt[
P
f2G D
1¡¾
f t ]
: (11)
Normalizing ±0 = 0; which implies D0 = 1 then ®;¯ and ¾ can be recovered from an Instrumental
Variables regression of the di¤erence of the logs of the observed market share of j and the outside alternative
on xjt ; pjt and sj=gt because
ln sjt ¡ lns0t = ¾ ln sj=gt ¡ ®pjt + xjt¯ + »jt : (12)
Again, instruments for prices and additional instruments for within security market shares must be used to
obtain consistent estimates because both variables are endogenous.1 6 ,1 7
2.2.4 Issuer Heterogeneity
To enrich the substitution patterns in the demand model I incorporate data from COMPUSTAT about all
the …rms that did new issues using equity-linked security in the sample. This will introduce heterogeneity
that will make the cross-price elasticity depend on the issuers’ characteristics. In this case, I consider a
vector of f …rm characteristics ft ; each one to be interacted with the price to obtain the following estimable
relationship:
lnsjt ¡ ln s0t = ¡®pjt + xjt¯ + pjtftÁ+ »jt: (13)
As we shall see in the results, the cost is that we will lose a signi…cant proportion of the observations in
the sample. Many of the issuers of equity-linked securities had no record in COMPUSTAT.
2.3 The Data
As I mentioned before, the SDC Database of New Issues records all the public and some private o¤erings
made since 1962. For securities de…ned in SDC as equity-linked or derivative corporate securities there are
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662 o¤erings up to March 2001 (the …rst issue, a LYON, was made in April of 1985). There are 50 securities
and a total of 98 varieties. I compute the varieties’ market shares over the whole market of new issues and
over the varieties within the security at di¤erent time periods.
I divide the whole sample in time periods rather than aggregate the data by varieties over the whole
time span studied. Overall aggregation would reduce signi…cantly the number of observations (to 98) and
would also eliminate the time variation of market shares and underwriting fees, compromising seriously the
consistency of the estimators. Thus, I treat each time period as an independent market, so that there is
a demand function for each variety at each time. The parameters of this function are identi…ed by cross-
sectional variation in prices, in the identity of the underwriter, and the issuer’s characteristics and by the
time variation in prices and issuer “experience”. The panel structure of the data is crucial since I want to
study the dynamics of the advantage to innovators.
To form the panel I must choose the length of each time period, though. The shorter the length of each
period increases the size of the usable data set but increases the risk of aggregating very few or unique deals
per period, which would increase dramatically the variation in the market shares. To avoid arbitrariness
in the choice of the length I do the estimations at four di¤erent levels of aggregation: using 16 periods
(annually), 8 periods (biannually), 11 periods (18 months) and 12 periods (16 months). In this way we can
also have an assessment of the robustness of the results to this choice.
The panel is unbalanced because not all securities are o¤ered at each period. Only two varieties are
o¤ered in the …rst period and 98 in the last. I consider standard equity as the outside option to issuers, i.e.,
standard equity is the variety j = 0: I approximate the total size of the market for new issues using
M = q0 + q1 + ::: + qJ : (14)
The unit of demand is number of deals, not dollars underwritten. This assumes that …rms set ex-ante
the amount of cash they want to raise in the o¤er, and the choice I model here is the choice of the security
and the underwriter.
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2.3.1 Variables
Market Shares Overall market shares, sj; are the observed aggregate number of deals for that variety in
a given period divided by the total number of new issues. Within-security market shares divide the number
of deals by the total number of issues using the relevant security:18
sjt =
qjt
Mt
;
sj=gt =
qjtP
l2Jg
qlt
:
Prices Prices of underwriting are the fees charged by the investment bank that leads the syndicate of
book managers of an o¤er. They are expressed as a percentage of the principal underwritten and called
underwriting spreads. Usually this spread can be disaggregated in the underwriting fees and management
fees. This disaggregation is seldom observable though, so the price variable I will use is the total spread.19
Demand Shifters in xjt The demand shifters that do not exactly indicate the information asymmetry
between underwriters are variables about the underwriter’s experience and reputation issuing this type
of securities. I use the total number of innovations in equity-linked products and innovations within the
particular family of the security accumulated by the underwriter. I use time period dummies to control for
observable economy-wide shocks and group dummy variables.
Advantage to Innovators One way to test if innovators have advantages on the revenue side is by
including a dummy variable that equals one when the underwriter was the …rst to issue that security.
A positive estimate of the coe¢cient of this variable would imply that, on average, …rms have stronger
preferences for innovators.
In the model presented above, the innovator has an advantage because it holds private information about
the security issued. However, this advantage could diminish as more deals are completed by imitators. Thus,
we would expect the estimate of the coe¢cient of the innovator dummy interacted with the number of deals
after the security was imitated to be negative. Moreover, if the security is a late generation of a given group,
more information about this type of securities would have been aggregated, and we would expect imitators
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to learn the innovators private information faster. Thus, I also interact this dummy with the generation
number to get a richer characterization of the dynamics of learning by doing.
Formally, I model these dynamics by specifying the component ¢vj of the …rms utility as:
¢vjt = °0ij + °1ij ¤ genj + °2ij ¤ genj ¤ et; (15)
where the dummy variable ij = 1 if the variety j is the innovator’s variety, gen is the generation number of
the security and et the number of time periods since the …rst imitation.
Issuers Data I use …nancial data from COMPUSTAT’s quarterly database that matches the period of the
o¤er. I use the total market capitalization to measure the size of the …rm. I also use indicators of common
equity, preferred equity, short term, long term debt and subordinated debt all expressed as percentages of
capitalization.
2.3.2 Instruments
Since it is very likely that the price is endogenous, instruments are needed to obtain consistent estimates of
the parameters of the model. In the case of the nested logit speci…cation, the within-securities market shares
are used as a regressor and these are possibly endogenous too. To choose appropriate instruments I follow
the suggestions of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and Berry(1994). Instruments for the underwriting
spread (price) include the averages of characteristics of the security over the competing varieties, like years
of call protection, years prior to call at par, percentage yield, which should not be correlated with the error
term since the advantage term summarizes all characteristics of the security. By the same token instruments
for the within-security market shares include characteristics of other underwriters in the same group (e.g.,
total and within family accumulated innovations by the other underwriters of the same security). To test if
these instruments over-identify the parameters of the models I perform a Hausman test of over-identifying
restrictions.
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3 Results
3.1 Logit Demand
To serve as a benchmark, …rst, I …t the simplest, yet most restrictive, demand model: the multinomial logit.
I only report here the results for the aggregation at 12 time periods for the sake of parsimony (the subsequent
estimations will include all aggregation levels to show the robustness of the results). Table 7 reports the
estimates of the parameters of (7), allowing for unobservable (to the econometrician) attributes in the di¤erent
varieties and using an instrumental variables method to account for the correlation between the price and
the unobservables (the standard errors were estimated using the Huber/White variance estimators, allowing
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within securities). I …t two models: one that only includes the
innovator indicator from equation (15) (reported in the “Base Case” column) and another one that speci…es
the full dynamics in (15). I use time period-speci…c dummies and …xed e¤ects for the security group.
We can see, for both columns, that most estimates have the expected sign. The underwriter’s fee (the
price) is signi…cant at the 90% level. In both cases the estimated coe¢cient is negative, which indicates
that the market demand for a banker’s variety is downward sloping in the fee. Note that I report the
estimated coe¢cient of the underwriting spread, so the estimated ® is positive. If, as assumed, the data
of the underwriting markets were generated by a model of oligopoly then the elasticity of demand at the
fees observed should be bigger than 1. In other words, bankers should be pricing their deals in the inelastic
portion of the demand curve. In Table 7 I report the number of estimated demand curves (of 323) that
violate this condition (i.e., that are elastic at the observed fee). Both logit models imply 50 and 49 inelastic
demands, respectively, out of 323 estimates. The average elasticity, though, is well above 1.
The average value to an issuer increases if the number of innovations in equity-linked securities accu-
mulated by its chosen underwriter increases. The negative sign of the number of accumulated innovations
within that security’s group, though, is an unexpected anomaly.
In both columns, the innovator dummy has a positive coe¢cient, signi…cant to the 99% level of con…dence,
suggesting stronger preferences for the innovator’s variety, ceteris paribus. The second column reveals an
interesting result. The coe¢cients on the innovator dummy, on the dummy interacted with the generation
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number, and on the dummy interacted with the generation number and the time after imitation are all
signi…cant to the 99% level of con…dence. The estimate of the coe¢cient of the …rst interaction term, i¤gen;
is positive, revealing that the later the generation, the higher the average initial advantage of the innovator.
The second interaction term, i ¤ gen ¤ et; has a negative estimated coe¢cient, showing that this advantage
decreases in the number of periods that imitators have been in the market, and that this advantage diminishes
faster the later the generation.
Since I estimate this model using instrumental variables, I test if the restrictions imposed by using
the chosen instruments over-identify the parameters of the model. I perform a Â2 that tests jointly if the
model is correctly speci…ed and the instruments over-identify the variations in the endogenous variables.
The test statistic and its p-value are also reported in Table 7. In any case, the null hypothesis of correct
speci…cation and over-identi…cation is rejected. Rejection is inconclusive about the source of the problem
(misspeci…cation or lack of identi…cation), but, as we mentioned before, the logit model is a simple version
that imposes restrictive substitution patterns across di¤erent varieties of underwriting services. In fact, the
previous results were obtained under the assumption that varieties of the same security were as close to
each other in the product space as varieties of di¤erent securities. Group dummies may have accounted for
proximity within the family, but not within the security. The results that follow are for the nested logit
model, that deals with this problem.
3.2 Nested Logit Demand
The estimation procedure for the nested logit demand model is similar to the one used for the multinomial
logit. The di¤erence is that, here, I include as a regressor the within-security market shares for each
variety in order to obtain an estimate of the intra-security substitution e¤ect. For this matter, additional
instruments must be used since the new regressor is believed to be correlated with the variety’s unobservable
characteristics. This model was …tted for the four di¤erent aggregations of data: 8,11,12, and 16 periods.
The results are shown in Table 8.
The estimated coe¢cient of price still has the correct sign for all the aggregations. It is signi…cant at
least at the 95% level but for the case where t = 8 (where its p-value is 0.121). The estimated elasticities
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increases sharply after accounting for the substitution e¤ect of the underwriting services of banks o¤ering
similar varieties. As a consequence the implied number of inelastic demands is much smaller (10 at most).
The estimated coe¢cient for the substitution parameter is signi…cant in all cases, and the estimate is
within the appropriate bounds, 0 and 1 (0:618 < b¾ < 0:745). This result is consistent with the theoretical
setup in which varieties within a security type are closer substitutes than varieties outside the security type:
issuers switch bankers before using a di¤erent security structure.
For all these cases I have …tted the model that describes the dynamics of the innovator’s advantage. The
estimates of the innovator’s advantage component reveal the same dynamic pattern as before: the innovator
dummy has a positive estimated coe¢cient, as well as the dummy interacted with the generation number.
The coe¢cient of the interactions of the innovator dummy with the generation number and the number of
periods after the …rst imitation is negative.
Figures 9 to 12 illustrate better what the estimates for the dynamics of the advantage mean in terms of the
time during which issuers value innovator’s varieties more than imitators’. I plot the estimated advantage
of the innovator, i.e., the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market share to the imitator’s (sInsIm), in the
vertical axis against time, measured in years, in the horizontal axis. We can see that, for all aggregations,
the innovator of a …rst generation security has the smallest initial advantage over his imitators. In all
cases, this advantage disappears slowly (in 12 years, on average). In sharp contrast, an innovator of, say,
a seventh generation security enjoys a bigger average initial advantage over other competing underwriters.
This advantage, though, will be gone shortly after the product’s second year of having been imitated (that
happens when both market shares are predicted to be equal to each other). One possible interpretation of
this result is that late generations are often very complicated modi…cations of existing securities. At …rst
it is di¢cult for imitators to learn how innovators are engineering the deals, but in time they should learn
faster given that more information has been aggregated about the security type or of the family of securities.
The hypothesis that the model is over-identi…ed and correctly speci…ed is rejected in the aggregations
over 11 and 12 time periods. Rejection may be due to the fact that the instruments chosen do not introduce
su¢cient independent variation themselves to account for the variation in all the endogenous variables of the
model (price and within-type market shares). It is also possible that the model is not fully speci…ed and the
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instruments themselves are correlated with other excluded exogenous variables. However, it is interesting
that the model is over-identi…ed when time periods cover 2 years (when t = 8). It is possible that within
shorter intervals, the instruments used are strongly correlated between themselves, while this may not be the
case for longer periods. It is also worth pointing out that, the rejection of over-identi…cation at some levels
of aggregation is not strong evidence against our choice of instruments, since almost all of the estimates are
consistent across all the aggregations.
3.3 Issuers Heterogeneity
The estimation by instrumental variables of the logit and nested logit demand models above may have
allowed us to obtain consistent estimates of the own-price elasticity, but it may still yield implausible cross-
price elasticities for varieties in di¤erent groups. Also, the test of over-identifying restrictions for the nested
logit speci…cation revealed that the model may still have not been completely speci…ed. In Table 9 I show
the results after adding the characteristics of the issuer to the model via interactions with the price variable.
Although it is not my goal to estimate these cross-price elasticities, adding heterogeneity will di¤erentiate
own-price elasticities by the type of …rms.
Despite the loss of observations when using issuers’ data, Table 9 shows results that do not di¤er qual-
itatively to the previous ones. The same dynamic behavior of the innovators advantage is observed in all
four cases. For all aggregations over time, the initial advantage is bigger than in the previous speci…cation
but it also decreases at a much faster rate. On average, for all cases of the model with interactions, the
advantage of each generation would be gone almost by the time predicted in the nested logit model without
interactions (see Figure 13 for the case when t = 8):
Of the …ve issuers variables that I interact with price, only market capitalization and preferred stock
as a percentage of market cap were found to be signi…cant at a level higher than 90%. Their estimated
coe¢cients were both positive. One possible explanation is that market capitalization is an approximation
for the available sources of …nance to the issuer. Similarly, since most of the varieties are forms of preferred
stock or convertible to preferred stock, …rms with a larger proportion of this type of stock have more available
instruments to raise capital and thus their demands are more elastic to underwriting spreads.
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Adding …rm speci…c data has improved the …t of the model in the sense that the estimated elasticities
of demand are higher and the number of predicted inelastic demands has decreased. Moreover, with the
additional …rm speci…c regressors the null hypothesis of over-identi…cation and correct speci…cation cannot
be rejected in any case, even with 90% con…dence. And as before, the estimates are consistent over all the
estimations.
4 Summary
This paper has provided new evidence of the sources of …rst-mover advantages in innovations in …nance. The
existing empirical literature of …nancial innovation identi…ed the following stylized fact: that investment
banks are able to pro…t from innovation despite being imitated almost immediately. Whatever advantage
they had over competitors, the clue to the pro…tability of unpatentable innovation in …nance was that
innovators were able to underwrite the largest market shares of corporate initial o¤erings.
This paper has tried to provide an answer to the question of what is the source of the advantage. For
this purpose I used data of all the New Issues using Equity-Linked and derivative corporate securities. This
paper has tested empirically the hypothesis that …rms have stronger preferences for underwriters that are
innovators, not imitators. The theoretical motivation for this conjecture was the following: …rms that need
to raise capital have to use a security which is engineered by investment banks that act as underwriters. If
the underwriter is the innovator of the security, this signals he is better informed about the choices that will
be best for the …rm. On average, the value to the …rm from doing the issue with the innovator will be larger.
To …nd an appropriate method to test this hypothesis I started by analyzing preliminary evidence that
suggested that innovations in corporate products such as equity-linked securities are frequently improvements
or generations of previous designs, so that families of securities could be identi…ed. I also noted that banks
o¤ered di¤erentiated underwriting services. Thus, I used the discrete choice theory of product di¤erentiation
as the framework to model the decisions of …rms to choose security structures and underwriters. The evidence
also suggested that innovators had advantages that presumably dissipated over time. Thus, I decided not
only to study the overall advantage of innovators, but its dynamics.
For that purpose I speci…ed the value to a …rm for choosing a particular security and a particular
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underwriter whose parameters were estimable. I claimed that the advantage that the innovator had over
its competitors in the market to underwrite new issues can be summarized in an index that included his
identity, the time elapsed after the innovator was imitated, and the generation of a security. Moreover, this
index appeared directly in the value function of a …rm because banks make di¤erent engineering choices
contingent on their private information.
Using data of all the new issues of corporate securities from the Securities Data Company Database I
estimated the parameters of the dynamics of the innovators’ advantage for multinomial logit and nested logit
demand models. I also used …nancial data from COMPUSTAT about the …rms that issued the securities in
the sample to enrich the speci…cation. A result consistent to all the speci…cations was that preferences for
innovators are, on average, stronger than for imitators. Interestingly, these preferences were initially stronger
the later generation of an innovation, possibly re‡ecting the fact that late generations get more complex and
are therefore harder to understand to imitators. The preference for an innovator over an imitator diminishes
in time, possibly as a result of imitators catching up with innovators. Further, the speed of the reduction
in the preference for innovators over imitators was larger for later generations. I interpreted this as the
fact that late generations appear naturally when more information has been aggregated about the family of
securities they belong to, making learning about the innovator’s private information easier.
The scope of the paper has been limited by the availability of data. Cost data was unavailable for most
of the observations, making it unworthy to estimate the model jointly with a pricing equation. This would
have also allowed to test if innovators and imitators have di¤erent marginal costs for underwriting o¤ers,
another potential source of …rst-mover advantages.
This paper has also taken innovation as exogenous. The set of choices available to …rms was taken as
given at each time. Certainly, one interesting way to continue this line of research would be to identify the
preferences of …rms for new securities at each time they make their choices. If the choices of the …rm were
to choose a security of a set of already existing securities or to rather choose to be the …rst issuer of a new
security, then the data in each deal could reveal what determines when an innovation is to be introduced.
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Figure 1
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten using di¤erent types of perpetual Preferred
Stock whose dividend payments are used by the issuer as deductions to taxable earnings. Underwritten totals
are aggregated on quarterly bases and expressed in millions of current US dollars. MIPS are cumulative
guaranteed monthly income preferred. QUIPS are quarterly version of MIPS, and QUICS are debt products,
convertible to preferred at the option of the investor. TOPRS pay cumulative monthly cash distributions,
and are issued by trusts, not limited liability corporations. The …rst generation product of this family were
MIPS. Di¤erentiated versions of MIPS appear later as next generations and their use as corporate …nance
instruments also peaks later.
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Figure 2
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten using di¤erent types of mandatorily
convertible Preferred Stock. Underwritten totals are aggregated on quarterly bases and expressed in millions
of current US dollars. PERCs are preferred stock convertible in 3 years, paying a premium dividend,
and callable anytime before conversion. DECS are similar, but the issuer gives up the call option before
conversion. STRYPES are a later generation of this family, and are convertible to cash also. PEPS are 4
year convertibles that are also puttable. Di¤erentiated versions of PERCS appear later as next generations
and their usage also peaks later.
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Figure 3
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten by di¤erent Investment banks using 3-year
mandatorily convertible preferred stock (PERCS), accumulated on a daily basis. Morgan Stanley was the
innovator of PERCS, and Dean-Witter (prior to the merger) and Merrill Lynch its imitators. PERCS are a
…rst generation product, i.e., the …rst product in the family of derivatives of convertible preferred stock.
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Figure 4
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten by di¤erent Investment banks using non-
callable mandatorily convertible preferred stock (DECS), accumulated on a daily basis. Salomon Brothers
was the innovator and it was imitated by Lehman. DECS are a third generation product, i.e., the third
product to appear in the family of derivatives of convertible preferred stock.
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Figure 5
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten by di¤erent Investment banks using Trust-
Originated, 3-year mandatorily convertible preferred stock, accumulated on a daily basis. This security is a
14th generation product, i.e., the 14th product to appear in the family of derivatives of convertible preferred
stock. The innovator is Robertson Securities, and it is imitated by Salomon, Morgan Stanley - Dean Witter
among others.
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Figure 6
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten by di¤erent Investment banks using bonds
with face value tied to appreciation of hard currencies (Principal Exchange Rate-Linked Securities, PERLS),
accumulated on a daily basis. Morgan Stanley was the innovator and it was imitated by Goldman, Sachs.
PERLS are a …rst generation product, i.e., the …rst product to appear in the family of debt whose face value
is tied to a publicly observable index.
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Figure 7
This Figure shows the plots of the total principal underwritten by di¤erent Investment banks using bonds
with face value tied to appreciation of S&P 500 or Amex Oil Index (SMARTS), accumulated on a daily basis.
Merrill Lynch was the innovator and it was imitated by Goldman, Sachs and Lehman. SMARTS are a 4th
generation product, i.e., the fourth product to appear in the family of debt whose face value is tied to a
publicly observable index.
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Figure 8
This …gure illustrates the decision tree faced by an issuer of a corporate security, indexed by i. It chooses
one variety, j 2 f1; 2; :::; Jg, which is valued as uij: A variety is determined by a combination of a security
type, g 2 f1; :::; Gg and a banker within the type.
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Figure 9
This …gure plots the estimated dynamics of the demand advantage that an innovator has over its imitators.
The vertical axis measures the parametric shift in the demand function for an innovator-engineered security
relative to an imitator-engineered security. It is expressed as the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market
share to the imitator’s market share: sinnovator
simitator
: The horizontal axis measures the time elapsed after the …rst
imitative deal any given security, in years. Each plotted line shows the estimated advantage dynamics for a
given generation. For a given time horizon, the predicted advantage to the innovator decreases monotonically
in the generation number. The advantage estimates are derived from the parameter estimates of the nested
logit demand, aggregating the data for through 8 time periods.
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Figure 10
This …gure plots the estimated dynamics of the demand advantage that an innovator has over its imitators.
The vertical axis measures the parametric shift in the demand function for an innovator-engineered security
relative to an imitator-engineered security. It is expressed as the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market
share to the imitator’s market share: sinnovator
simitator
: The horizontal axis measures the time elapsed after the …rst
imitative deal any given security, in years. Each plotted line shows the estimated advantage dynamics for a
given generation. For a given time horizon, the predicted advantage to the innovator decreases monotonically
in the generation number. The advantage estimates are derived from the parameter estimates of the nested
logit demand, aggregating the data for through 11 time periods.
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Figure 11
This …gure plots the estimated dynamics of the demand advantage that an innovator has over its imitators.
The vertical axis measures the parametric shift in the demand function for an innovator-engineered security
relative to an imitator-engineered security. It is expressed as the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market
share to the imitator’s market share: sinnovator
simitator
: The horizontal axis measures the time elapsed after the …rst
imitative deal any given security, in years. Each plotted line shows the estimated advantage dynamics for a
given generation. For a given time horizon, the predicted advantage to the innovator decreases monotonically
in the generation number. The advantage estimates are derived from the parameter estimates of the nested
logit demand, aggregating the data for through 12 time periods.
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Figure 12
This …gure plots the estimated dynamics of the demand advantage that an innovator has over its imitators.
The vertical axis measures the parametric shift in the demand function for an innovator-engineered security
relative to an imitator-engineered security. It is expressed as the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market
share to the imitator’s market share: sinnovator
simitator
: The horizontal axis measures the time elapsed after the …rst
imitative deal any given security, in years. Each plotted line shows the estimated advantage dynamics for a
given generation. For a given time horizon, the predicted advantage to the innovator decreases monotonically
in the generation number. The advantage estimates are derived from the parameter estimates of the nested
logit demand, aggregating the data for through 16 time periods.
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Figure 13
This …gure plots the estimated dynamics of the demand advantage that an innovator has over its imitators.
The vertical axis measures the parametric shift in the demand function for an innovator-engineered security
relative to an imitator-engineered security. It is expressed as the predicted ratio of the innovator’s market
share to the imitator’s market share: sinnovator
simitator
: The horizontal axis measures the time elapsed after the …rst
imitative deal any given security, in years. Each plotted line shows the estimated advantage dynamics for a
given generation. For a given time horizon, the predicted advantage to the innovator decreases monotonically
in the generation number. The advantage estimates are derived from the parameter estimates of the nested
logit demand with issuers heterogeneity, aggregating the data for through 8 time periods.
41
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1. The value of choosing variety j is u(µj ; :) + "ij : Thus, given the properties
of u(:); if µ¤j maximizes uijt then it must be that
8m
@u(:)
@µmj
jµ¤j = um(µ
¤
j ; :) = 0; (16)
where µmj corresponds to each entry of the µj vector.
To …nd the pro…t maximizing choices, let us …rst solve for the demand function for some variety j, as
given in (3). Note …rst that the probability that an arbitrary issuer chooses variety j over any other variety
k is
Pr(uij ¸ uik) = Pr("ik · u(µj )¡ u(µk) + "ij )
= G(u(µj)¡ u(µk ) + "ij):
Further, since each "ik is drawn independently from G(:); the probability that j is the chosen variety for i is
Y
j 6=kG(u(µj )¡ u(µk ) + "ij );
and the aggregate demand for this variety is just
qj (µj; :) = M
Z
"
Y
k 6=jG(u(µj) ¡ u(µk ) + "
0)dG("0):
A pro…t maximizing choice of eµj would solve the set of …rst-order conditions
8m
@¼ j
@µmj
jeµj = 0:
42
Note that any of these …rst-order conditions have the form:
@¼j
@µmj
= pj
@qj(µj; :)
@µmj
¡ c0(qj (µj ; :))
@qj(µj ; :)
@µmj
;
where
@qj(µj ; :)
@µmj
= M
Z
"
um (µj)f
X
k 6=j
G0(u(µj )¡ u(µk) + "
0)
G(u(µj )¡ u(µk) + "0)
g
Y
k 6=j
G(u(µj)¡ u(µk ) + "
0)dG("0):
Thus, since @¼j
@µmj
= fpj ¡ c
0(qj (µj; :))g
@qj(µj;:)
@µmj
and p ¡ c0 > 0, it must be that @qj(µj;:)
@µmj
= 0 if each µmj is a
maximizer. Moreover,
@qj(µj ; :)
@µmj
= Mum(µj )
Z
"
um(µj )f
X
k 6=j
G0(u(µj)¡ u(µk ) + "
0)
G(u(µj)¡ u(µk ) + " 0)
g
Y
k 6=j
G(u(µj )¡ u(µk) + "
0)dG(" 0)
where G0(:) > 0;G(:) > 0 so the integral above is strictly positive. @qj(µj;:)
@µmj
= 0 is only satis…ed when
um(µj) = 0 8m and that is only when µj = µ
¤
j :
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Proof of Proposition 3. Let j and k; l be varieties of the same security g, and q an arbitrary variety
of another arbitrary security. By Proposition 2
vj (y ¡ p; 1; :) ¸ vk (y ¡ p; 0; :);
vj (y ¡ p; 1; :) ¸ vl (y ¡ p; 0; :):
The aggregate demand for the innovator’s variety, given than varieties of the same security are priced
symmetrically is
qj (p; :) =
Z
"
G(¢vg + "
0)
Y
l 6=k;l2Jg
G(v(y ¡ p; 1; :) ¡ v(y ¡ pl; 0; :) + "
0)
¤
Y
q 6=j;q =2JgG(v(y ¡ p; 1; :)¡ v(y ¡ pq ; b; :) + "
0)dG(" 0):
For the imitators’ varieties, the demand is
qk(p; :) =
Z
"
G(¡¢vg + "
0)
Y
l 6=k;l2Jg
G(v(y ¡ p; 0; :)¡ v(y¡ pl ;0; :) + "
0)
¤
Y
q 6=j;q=2JgG(v(y ¡ p; 0; :)¡ v(y ¡ pq; b; :) + "
0)dG("0):
Clearly, since G(:) is a strictly increasing function, by Proposition 2
G(¢vg + "
0) ¸ G(¡¢vg + "
0);
G(v(y ¡ p; 1; :)¡ v(y¡ pl ;0; :) + "
0) ¸
G(v(y ¡ p; 0; :)¡ v(y ¡ pl; 0; :) + "
0);
and G(v(y ¡ p; 1; :)¡ v(y ¡ pq; b; :) + "
0) ¸
G(v(y ¡ p; 0; :)¡ v(y ¡ pq ; b; :) + "
0):
and thus
qj(p; :)¸qk(p; :):
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Note that if ¢vg > 0; then qj (p; :) >qk (p; :).
45
Appendix 2
List and brief description of the Equity-Linked and
Derivative securities in the SDC Database
from 1985 to 2001
Name Description
1. Debt Products
RISRS Rising Interest Subordinated Redeemable Securities.
Debt notes subordinated to existing and future debt notes.
2. Convertible Debt (Zero Coupon)
LYONS Liquid Yield Option Notes. Zero-Coupon bonds, convertible to common,
stock, temporarily non-callable and non-puttable.
3. Convertible Debt (Dividend Paying)
SIRENS Set-Up Income Redeemable Equity Notes. Low dividend paying,
subordinated debt, callable, convertible to common stock.
ICONS Investment Company Convertible Notes. Notes issued by closed-end
mutual funds that are puttable, conversion price adjusted yearly.
4. Convertible Preferred
PERCS Preferred Equity Redemption Cumulative Stock. Mandatorily convertible
preferred, after 3 years, callable anytime.
YES Shares Yield Enhanced Stock. High dividend paying preferred, mandatorily
convertible in 3 years, callable anytime.
(continues)
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Name Description
4. Convertible Preferred (contd.)
DECS Dividend Enhanced Convertible Stock. Non-callable, mandatorily
convertible preferred stock.
X-Caps Exchangeable Capital Securities. Fixed dividend paying, perpetual,
callable, convertible to subordinated preferred stock.
ACES Automatically Convertible Equity Securities. Puttable, mandatorily
convertible to common stock in 4 years.
PRIDES Preferred Redeemable Increased Dividend Equity Securities. Callable,
non-puttable, 4 years conversion, premium dividend paying preferred stock.
PEPS Participating Equity Preferred. High dividend yield, 4 year conversion,
callable and puttable preferred stock.
SAILS Stock Appreciation Income Linked Securities. 3 years mandatory conversion,
converted at premium if common stock appreciates.
AutoComEx Automatic Common Exchange Securities. Treasury notes, mandatorily
convertible to issuer’s common in 3 years. Callable.
PEPS (2) Premium Equity Participation Securities. Preferred Stock mandatorily convertible
in 3 years, conversion ratio determined ex-post.
STRYPES Structured Yield Product Exchangeable. Preferred stock convertible to common
or cash. Initial 20% appreciation given up in exchange of higher yield.
MARCS Mandatorily Adjustable Redeemable Preferred. Callable, convertible in 4 years
preferred stock. Depreciation of convertible common bounded at 10%.
MEDS Mandatorily Exchangeable Debt Securities. 4-year mandatorily convertible
preferred at a premium.
(continues)
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Name Description
4. Convertible Preferred (contd.)
Trust Convertible Preferred Mandatorily convertible preferred, issued by a business trust, not a
Limited Liability Corporation.
TRACES Trust Automatic Common Exchange Securities. Trust-originated preferred
stock convertible to common stock. Conversion after 3 years.
5. Short-Term Tax-Advantage
FRAPS Floating/Adjustable Rate Preferred Stock. Preferred Stock that pays a …xed
for 5 years. Adjustable rate after 5th year, if not called.6.
6. Perpetual Tax-Advantage
MIPS Cumulative Guaranteed Monthly Income Preferred. Perpetual preferred
stock. Dividend payments used as tax deductible by the issuer.
EPICS Exchangeable Preferred Income Cumulative Shares. Perpetual preferred stock
with the issuer’s option to convert to common anytime.
MIDS Monthly Income Debt Securities. Perpetual preferred stock with the
issuer’s option to defer monthly dividend payments.
TOPRS Trust-Originated Preferred. 49 year preferred stock, issued by business
trust. Monthly cumulative …xed cash distributions.
QUIDS Quarterly Income Debt Securities. 50-year preferred with bounded deferral
horizon and initially non-callable.
QUIPS Quarterly Income Preferred Securities. 49-year preferred with the issuer’s
option to shorten maturity.
(continues)
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Name Description
6. Perpetual, Tax-Advantage (contd.)
QUICS Quarterly Income Capital Securities. Tax-deductible, 30-year bonds with
interest deferral option.
RES-CAPS Reset Capital Securities. Perpetual preferred stock, with an initial call
protection.
COPRS Canadian Originated Preferred Securities. Non-convertible, tax-deductible
dividend-paying preferred, issued by Canadian LLCs.
7. Convertible, Tax-Advantage
Convertible MIPS Optionally convertible perpetual preferred stock that is tax deductible.
Initially protected from a call, with optional interest deferral.
TECONS Term Convertible Shares. Mandatorily convertible, tax deductible, and
callable only if price of common stock is high enough.
Convertible TOPRS Same as TOPRS (above), but mandatorily convertible to common stock.
QDCS Quarterly Debt Capital Securities. 20-year or less securities, convertible
to preferred stock at maturity. Tax deductible coupon, callable.
EPPICS Equity Providing Preferred Income Convertible. 40 year convertible bonds,
convertible to cash, common or preferred stock.
TRUPS Trust Preferred Stock. Callable notes, tax deductible, that investor has to buy
jointly with preferred stock from a subsidiary of issuer.
Convertible QUIPS Same as QUIPS (above), convertible to common, at di¤erent maturities.
(continues)
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Name Description
8. Index-Tied Principal
PERLS Principal Exchange Rate-Linked Securities. Dollar denominated bonds with
redemption value tied to a “hard” currency .
SIRS Stock Index Return Securities. Bonds with face value adjusted upwards if S&P
MidCap 400 index appreciates enough.
MITTS Market Index Target-Term Securities. Zero coupon bond, principal tied to the S&P
500 Index.
SMARTS Stock Market Annual Reset Term Notes. Variable capped coupon paying bond,
principal can be tied to S&P or Amex Oil indexes.
EPS Equity Participation Securities. Zero coupon bonds. Appreciation of principal
pegged to S&P 500, capped and ‡oored.
CPNs Currency Protected Notes. Principal of bonds tied inversely to Canadian six-
month banker’s acceptance rate.
SUNS Stock Upside Note Securities. Principal tied to a basket of telecom stocks.
The depreciation is ‡oored.
CUBS Customized Upside Basket Securities. Zero coupon, downside protected bond
with principal tied to a basket of stocks across industries.
9. Stock Tied-Principal
ELKs Equity-Linked Securities. Annual interest paying notes. Principal tied to the
performance of the stock of a chosen …rm.
YEELDS Yield-Enhanced Equity-Linked Debt Securities. 3-year notes. Principal tied to the
stock of a …rm in the information technology sector. Appreciation capped.
(continues)
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Name Description
9. Stock-Tied Principal (contd).
CHIPS Common-Linked Higher Income Participation Securities. High-yield annual
coupon debt with appreciation tied to stock options, ‡oored and capped.
PERQS Performance Equity-Linked Redemption Quarterly Pay Securities. Quarterly
coupon paying notes. Principal tied to a given stock at investor’s option.
10. Privatization Exchangeable Debt
PENs Privatization Exchangeable Notes. Foreign currency and dollar denominated
bonds exchangeable for a privatized …rm shares.
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Appendix 3
Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
1. O¤er
Principal (US$ millions) 306:160 446:515 175:50 10:00 4; 050:00
Underwriting spread (%) 2:442 1:135 3:00 0:085 12:60
Private placement (Yes = 1) 0:138 0:345 0 0 1
Days before …rst imitative deal 484:440 642:875 214 7 2408
2. Issuer information
Total Capitalization (US$ millions) 15;668:700 44; 750:980 4; 115:70 1:20 742; 536:60
Common stock (% of capitalization) 43:436 22:513 44:97 0:27 100
Preferred stock (% of capitalization) 7:574 11:501 5:29 0:01 99:31
Long-term debt (% of capitalization) 43:522 19:546 42:98 0 100
Short-term debt (% of capitalization) 15:991 16:551 10:14 0:01 52:99
3. Bank’s market share
(share of total deals, by period)
Variety’s share of all equity underwriting 0:0008 0:0019 0 0 0:0148
Variety’s share of the product market 0:6857 0:3787 0:9621 0:0256 1
Standard Equity market share 0:9535 0:0149 0:9454 0:9395 0:9959
(continues)
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
4. Other variety indicators (by period)
Innovations accumulated by bank in category 1:172 1:293 1 0 4
Innovations accumulated by bank (total) 5:023 5:198 3 0 14
Product innovator dummy (Yes = 1) 0:585 0:493 1 0 1
Group innovator dummy (Yes = 1) 0:328 0:470 0 0 1
Years or protection from call 3:968 2:645 3:963 0 30
Yield to maturity (%) 6:809 5:827 7:292 0 73:094
Yield advantage (%) 2:151 3:424 0 0 31
5. Instruments (average over other varieties
or other banks in same product market).
Innovations accumulated by bank in category 0:503 0:743 0 0 4
Innovations accumulated by bank (total) 2:566 3:435 1 0 14
Years or protection from call 1:395 3:477 0 0 19:583
Yield to maturity (%) 2:772 4:903 0 0 24:133
Yield advantage (%) 0:618 2:0888 0 0 11:998
Data are for 662 issues of equity-linked and derivative securities between April 1985 and March
2001. Market shares and variety speci…c data statistics are computed after the aggregation required
by the estimation period.
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Footnotes
1. For a list of innovations in corporate securities until 1991, and a description of some of them, see
Finnerty (1992). All innovations in equity-linked and derivative corporate securities until March 2001
are listed in this paper.
2. The underwriting spread is the fee charged by an investment bank or a syndicate, equal to the di¤erence
between the gross sales to investors and the net proceeds received by the issuer.
3. Tufano’s study, for example, compares spreads only between banks issuing the same security. In that
sense, it is not a demand estimation for the underwriting services of banks across di¤erent securities.
4. Tufano (1995) and Finnerty (1992) also describe the reasons for the appearance of the most important
innovations between 1830 and 1930 and since the 1970s, respectively.
5. According to anecdotal evidence gathered by Naslund (1986), though, …rms usually turn to the services
of expert issuers of innovative products, i.e., innovators, even if they used another bank for other
services. This evidence comes from the testimonies of twenty …nancial product developers in New
York.
6. Black and Silber (1986) also study …rst-mover advantages in …nance but they focus in futures exchanges
as the innovators, not in investment banks. They claim that futures exchanges that develop new
contracts have the advantage that they provide liquidity for investors earlier than the competing
exchanges so they are able to attract agents that have to choose where to trade.
7. Kanemasu, Litzenberger and Rolfo (1986) observe the same pattern for the case of stripped treasury
securities.
8. See Pratt (1995) for a detailed comparison of MIPS and TOPRS.
9. For every product I have compiled articles in Investment Dealers’ Digest, American Banker, Dow Jones
Newswires and others found using the ABI Search Engine. For every one I was able to …nd a description
of the product, and a reference to an older product which was similar to it. I am especially indebted
to Tom Pratt, who writes a descriptive article of almost every corporate security invented.
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10. We can …nd some attempts in the literature to endogenize the advantage of an innovator over its
imitators. Herrera and Schroth (2000) provide a model that explains why innovators of derivatives
acquire superior information over competitors. In a di¤erent perspective, Black and Silber (1986)
derive an advantage to pioneering exchanges that establish liquidity early and Allen and Gale (1994,
Chapter 4) show how …rst-movers can preempt imitation choosing their initial capacity as a Stackelberg
leader.
11. Some securities can also be grouped into categories of similar instruments, i.e., what I referred to above
as “families ”. For example, SIRENS or ICONS are dividend paying convertible debt instruments, while
ELKS or YEELDS are zero-coupon instruments with principal payment tied to the appreciation of a
given stock portfolio. I do not deal with this prior level of classi…cation in the theoretical model but
we do account for proximity of securities between di¤erent groups in the econometric model.
12. The reader may have noticed already that this approach is equivalent to the derivation of an indirect
utility function.
13. Su¢cient conditions for strategic complementarity would be that @
2qj
@pj@pk
> 0 and @qj
@pk
> 0: The latter
condition is obvious just by inspecting the aggregate demand (see appendix). The former will be met
if v(:) is not too concave.
14. The su¢cient conditions for this would be that
@qj
@¢v
> 0 and
@ 2qj
@qj@¢v
: Again, the former holds and it
is veri…ed just by inspecting the aggregate demand function. The latter condition is met only under
certain assumptions about G(:) and v(:):
15. By imposing the quasi-linearity of income, wealth e¤ects are ruled out (® would be the (constant)
marginal utility of income). This assumption is not only tractable and convenient for the estimation
but quite reasonable for some types of products. I believe this assumption is justi…ed for this particular
data set: the amount paid in underwriting fees is small relative to the value of the outstanding equity
of issuers (the 95th percentile of the ratio of fees to equity is 0.02) or to their yearly earnings (the
median proportion of fees of the yearly earnings is 0.06; the third quartile is 0.21). As an example,
Nevo (2000) argues that it is reasonable to assume quasi-linearity for ready-to-eat cereal because their
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price represents a small share of household expenditures. By the same token, it is not reasonable
to make this assumption for the demand of cars. In fact, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) use a
Cobb-Douglas utility function, i.e., the additive term for net income is ® log(yit ¡ pjt):
16. See Berry (1994) for a proof.
17. Enriching the random indirect utility will allow more reasonable substitution patterns. This can be
veri…ed by inspecting the price elasticities of the model. For two varieties, j and l, the price elasticities
@sjpl
@plsj
would be given by:
´jl =
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
¡®pjf
1
1¡¾
¡ sj[1 +
¾
1¡¾
D1¡¾g
P
f2G D
1¡¾
f ]g for j = l 2 Jg;
®plslf1 +
¾
1¡¾
D1¡¾g
P
f2G D
1¡¾
f for j 6= l; and j; l 2 Jg;
®plsl otherwise.
(17)
Cross-price elasticities for two di¤erent varieties within the same group will be di¤erent than cross-price
elasticities for varieties across di¤erent groups, even if they have the same prices and market shares
(provided that ¾ > 0). Still, the cross-price elasticity of one variety with varieties of other groups will
be identical, even if one variety belongs to a group that is closer to the other in terms of the uses of
the security.
18. In some periods, market shares of existing varieties are zero. The computation of logit and nested
logit models requires taking the logarithm if these shares. To avoid the indeterminacy problem I use a
transformation sj that does not alter its distribution signi…cantly. I compute instead
ln s¤jt = ln(sjt + 0:00001);
ln s¤j=g = ln(sj=gt + 0:00001):
Excluding these observations would not only bias the sample selection but also imply a loss of 191
observations that actually reveal that the demand was zero.
19. For periods of zero market shares no information of the bids made by potential underwriters is observed.
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Since these varieties were available to …rms, although none chose to use them, we assume there is a
going price for them. We approximate this price with the last observed price for that variety.
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Table 1: Total Principal Underwritten in the New Issues Markets using Standard Equity and Equity-Linked
Products between April 1985 and March 2001
Time Total Underwritten Principal Average Deal Size
Period Standard Equity-Linked and Standard Equity-Linked and
Equity Derivative Products Equity Derivative Products
1 64; 477 3; 915 38 489
2 61; 034 590 36 84
3 35; 801 4; 120 48 589
4 45; 123 9; 314 46 388
5 61; 216 19; 517 57 887
6 99; 507 10; 750 57 336
7 129; 073 22; 106 56 287
8 90; 397 22; 414 56 270
9 139; 518 32; 357 61 225
10 169; 569 35; 463 83 269
11 143; 016 19; 616 112 265
12 230; 734 20; 680 381 440
Figures shown are expressed in millions of current US$. The source of the data is the
Securities Data Company Database of New Issues. Each one of the twelve periods is an
equal sized interval between April 1995 and March 2001.
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Table 2: Classi…cation of Equity Linked and Derivative Corporate Securites
Category Securities
1. Debt Products. RISRS.
2. Convertible Debt (Zero Coupon). LYONS.
3. Convertible Debt (Dividend Paying) SIRENS, ICONS.
4. Convertible Preferreds PERCS, YES Shares, DECS, X-Caps, ACES, PRIDES, PEPS, SAILS,
AutoComEx, PEPS (2), STRYPES, MARCS, MEDS, Trust Convertible
Preferreds, TRACES.
5. Short-Term Tax-Advantage FRAPS.
6. Perpetual Tax-Advantage MIPS, EPICS, MIDS, TOPRS, QUIDS, QUIPS, QUICS, RES-CAPS,
COPRS.
7. Convertible, Tax-Advantage Convertible MIPS, TECONS, Convertible TOPRS, QDCS, EPPICS,
TRUPS, Convertible QUIPS.
8. Index-Tied Principal PERLS, SIRS, MITTS, SMARTS, EPS, CPNs, SUNS, CUBS.
9. Stock Tied-Principal ELKs, YEELDS, CHIPS, PERQS.
10. Privatization Exchangeable Debt PENs.
The list shown above contains the names of all the equity-linked and derivative corporate securities issued
between 1985 and 1991. The securities are classi…ed into categories that are also referred to as groups or families.
They are listed in chronological order of appearance, which is also called the generation number.
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Table 3: Innovators’ Market Shares for Imitated Securities
Product Innovator
Number of 
Rivals
Share of 
Deals (%)
Leader
Share of 
Principal 
(%)
Leader
RISRS Kemper Securities 1 43 No 50
Yes 
(Tied)
SIRS Paine Webber 1 67 Yes 90 Yes
DECS
Salomon-Smith 
Barney
1 94 Yes 79 Yes
Equity Participation 
Securities
Merrill Lynch 1 94 Yes 50
Yes 
(Tied)
MIDS Goldman, Sachs 2 29 No (2) 30 No (2)
SMART Notes Merrill Lynch 2 60 Yes 41 Yes
X-CAPs Merrill Lynch 2 67 Yes 92 Yes
ELKS
Salomon-Smith 
Barney
2 82 Yes 90 Yes
PERCS Morgan Stanley 2 82 Yes 88 Yes
QIDS Goldman, Sachs 2 82 Yes 76 Yes
PERLS Morgan Stanley 2 93 Yes 97 Yes
LYONS Merrill Lynch 2 97 Yes 95 Yes
FRAPS Merrill Lynch 3 22 No (2) 23 No (2)
RST-CAPS Lehman Brothers 3 25 Yes (Tied) 22 No (2)
MIPS Goldman, Sachs 3 89 Yes 96 Yes
TOPRS Merrill Lynch 3 95 Yes 92 Yes
TRUPS Salomon Brothers 4 71 Yes 72 Yes
Convertible TOPRS Merrill Lynch 6 47 Yes 33 No (2)
Trust-Originated 
Convertible Preferreds
Robertson 7 6 No (5) 5 No (4)
15 14Total Number of Leads (of 18 cases)
An entry of ‘Yes’ in the …fth or last columns (Leader) means that the innovator had the biggest
market share. A ‘No’ entry is followed by the innovator’s ranking in brackets. A tie for the lead is
also shown in brackets.
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Table 4: Ratio of the Total Principal Underwritten by Imitators relative to the Principal Underwritten by
the Innovator (Average over imitated securities)
Generation of Imitated Securities Average Ratio
First Generation (7 securities) 0:337
All Generations (18 securities) 0:679
The ratio is the total principal underwritten by the innovator divided by the total principal
underwritten by all imitators, for any given security. The ratio is averaged over all the imitated
securities and over only those imitated securities that were a …rst generation product. There
are 18 securities that were imitated, 7 of which where …rst generations.
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Table 5: Within-Security Standard Deviation of Some Security Characteristics for Innovators and Imitators
Characteristics of the O¤ering Imitators Innovator
O¤er Yield to Maturity 0:779 12:949
n 46 418
Spread over Treasury Bills 25:420 87:528
n 10 31
Years of Call Protection 4:055 1:772
n 31 407
Years before Called at Par 1:043 2:703
n 23 296
Yield Advantage 0:840 3:610
n 8 167
Percentage Yield 0:858 15:569
n 35 288
This table reports the standard deviations of some characteristics within the security. The
within variation is computed for all imitated equity-linked and derivative securities, engineerd
by innovators and imitators. The number of observation used for each is denoted by n.
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Table 6: Paired Di¤erence of Means Test for the Underwriting Spreads of Innovators and Imitators
¢ = Underwriting Spread by Innovator - Underwriting Spread by Imitator
Periods of Aggregation Observations Mean Standard Error P-value (¢ > 0)
16 137 0:058 0:0537 0:139
12 113 0:063 0:0573 0:137
11 110 0:051 0:0577 0:189
8 79 0:083 0:0706 0:121
The means of the underwriting spreads for innovators and imitators at a given time period
for a given security are compared using a paired di¤erence of means test. Four di¤erent
frequencies are used to de…ne a time period: one year (t = 16); 17 months (t = 12); 18
months (t = 11); and 2 years (t = 8): The alternative hypothesis to compute the p-value is
that the di¤erence of means is positive.
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Table 7: Estimation Results with Logit Demand
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s underwriting of
a given security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) Base case With dynamics
Underwriting Spread (®) ¡0:735¤ ¡0:783¤
(0:441) (0:450)
Total equity-linked innovations 0:075¤¤ 0:842¤¤
by the underwriter (0:031) (0:033)
Total equity-linked Innovations ¡0:359¤¤ ¡0:361¤¤
in that category by the underwriter (0:152) (0:150)
Innovator dummya 2:010¤¤¤ 4:433¤¤¤
(0:320) (1:081)
Innovator dummy interacted ¡ 0:177¤¤¤
with the security’s generation number (0:054)
Innovator dummy interacted with ¡ ¡0:334¤¤¤
the deal and generation numbers (0:105)
Group dummiesb Yes Yes
Time dummiesc Yes Yes
Instrumented regressors Underwriting Spread Underwriting Spread
Â2 statistic for OIR Testd 14:115 17:1836
P-value 0:079 0:028
(continues)
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Table 7: continued.
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s
underwriting of a security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) Base case With dynamics
(continued)
Average elasticity of market share to the 1:834 1:955
Underwriting Spread (0:797) (0:850)
Median elasticity of market share to the Underwriting Spread 2:018 2:151
Number of predicted inelastic demands 50 49
Number of observations 323 323
R-squared 0:292 0:324
F-statistic 45:47¤¤¤ 11:85¤¤¤
The sample includes all o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative securities between 1985 and 2001. The parameters
of a theoretical logit demand model are obtained using an Instrumental Variables estimator. The standard errors
are obtained using a Huber-White covariance estimator, robust for heteroskedasticity and within-security
correlation. They are shown below the estimate, in parenthesis. Estimates followed by ¤¤¤ are signi…cant to the 0.01
level, by ¤¤ to the 0.05 level, and by ¤ to the 0.1 level. Each observation consists of the market share of a bank’s
variety of a given security at a given time period, associated with the characteristics of the security and the banker,
in the same period, and their instruments. The sample time span has been split in 12 periods of equal length.
a Equals one when the underwriter is the innovator of that security.
b A dummy for each one of the 10 categories. Equals one when the security belongs to that category.
c A dummy for each one of the 12 periods. Equals one when the observation corresponds to that period.
d Test of Over-identi…ed Restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly speci…ed and that the
instruments over-identify the variation in the endogenous regressor. The p-value is shown below the Â2 statistic.
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Table 8: IV estimates for the base Nested Logit Demand Model
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s underwriting of
a given security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
Underwriting Spread (®) ¡1:858¤¤ ¡1:025¤¤ ¡1:206¤¤ ¡1:939
(0:919) (0:560) (0:577) (1:246)
Product Market Share, in logarithms (¾) 0:634¤¤ 0:658¤¤ 0:618¤ 0:745¤¤
(0:285) (0:367) (0:359) (0:300)
Total equity-linked innovations 0:085¤¤ 0:088¤¤¤ 0:096¤¤¤ 0:034
by the underwriter (0:033) (0:033) (0:034) (0:042)
Total equity-linked Innovations ¡0:515¤¤¤ ¡0:386¤¤ ¡0:422¤¤¤ ¡0:104
in that category by the underwriter (0:172) (0:154) (0:158) (0:208)
Innovator dummya 2:701¤¤ 2:943¤¤ 2:532¤ 2:976¤
(1:276) (1:322) (1:341) (1:835)
Innovator dummy interacted 0:116¤¤¤ 0:171¤¤¤ 0:123¤¤¤ 0:129¤¤¤
with the security’s generation number (0:038) (0:056) (0:040) (0:050)
Innovator dummy interacted with ¡0:157¤¤ ¡0:291¤¤¤ ¡0:270¤¤ ¡0:476¤
the deal and generation numbers (0:088) (0:106) (0:119) (0:250)
Group dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented regressors: Underwriting Spread
and Product Market Shares (in logarithms)
Â2 statistic for OIR Testd 3:553 32:300 27:206 3:015
P-value 0:981 0:000 0:004 0:991
(continues)
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Table 8: continued.
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s
underwriting of a security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
(continued)
Average elasticity of market share to the 12:967 8:276 7:958 18:778
Underwriting Spread (5:542) (3:596) (3:440) (8:541)
Median elasticity of market share to the Underwriting Spread 14:398 9:100 8:904 21:497
Number of predicted inelastic demands 9 19 10 4
Number of observations 418 323 312 225
R-squared 0:093 0:290 0:258 0:029
F-statistic 9:04¤¤¤ 12:30¤¤¤ 10:33¤¤¤ 8:55¤¤¤
The sample includes all o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative securities between 1985 and 2001. The parameters
of a theoretical logit demand model are obtained using an Instrumental Variables estimator. The standard errors
are obtained using a Huber-White covariance estimator, robust for heteroskedasticity and within-security
correlation. They are shown below the estimate, in parenthesis. Estimates followed by ¤¤¤ are signi…cant to the 0.01
level, by ¤¤ to the 0.05 level, and by ¤ to the 0.1 level. Each observation consists of the market share of a bank’s
variety of a given security at a given time period, associated with the characteristics of the security and the banker,
in the same period, and their instruments. The sample time span has been split in 16,12,11 and 8 periods.
a Equals one when the underwriter is the innovator of that security.
b A dummy for each one of the 10 categories. Equals one when the security belongs to that category.
c A dummy for each one of the 12 periods. Equals one when the observation corresponds to that period.
d Test of Over-identi…ed Restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly speci…ed and that the
instruments over-identify the variation in the endogenous regressor. The p-value is shown below the Â2 statistic.
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Table 9: IV estimates for the Nested Logit Demand with Firm Heterogeneity
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s underwriting of
a given security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
Underwriting Spread (®) ¡0:605 ¡1:041¤ ¡0:987¤ ¡1:782¤
(0:579) (0:539) (0:581) (1:027)
Product Market Share, in logarithms (¾) 0:644¤ 0:664¤ 0:821¤ 0:558
(0:396) (0:347) (0:461) (0:383)
Underwriting Spread interacted with Market 1:11¤¤¤ 1:91¤¤¤ 1:26¤ 3:07¤¤¤
Capitalization (US$ Million) (0:415) (0:500) (0:743) (0:836)
Underwriting Spread interaction with Propotion 0:022 0:023¤ 0:018 0:056
of Preferred Stock (0:015) (0:015) (0:014) (0:028)
Innovator dummya 4:980¤¤¤ 4:679¤¤ 3:841¤¤ 7:022¤¤¤
(1:370) (1:625) (1:698) (2:066)
Innovator dummy interacted 0:111¤¤ 0:188¤¤¤ 0:120¤¤ 0:199¤¤¤
with the security’s generation number (0:047) (0:065) (0:053) (0:069)
Innovator dummy interacted with ¡0:359¤¤¤ ¡0:467¤¤¤ ¡0:466¤¤¤ ¡1:001¤¤¤
the deal and generation numbers (0:075) (0:137) (0:149) (0:258)
Group dummiesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrumented regressors: Underwriting Spread and
Product Market Share (in logarithms)
Â2 statistic for OIR Testd 2:556 15:660 11:975 2:974
P-value 0:995 0:154 0:366 0:992
(continues)
70
Table 9: continued.
The dependent variable is the di¤erence of the logarithms of the market shares of a banks’s
underwriting of a security and of the market share of equity underwritings: ln(sj) ¡ ln(so):
Regressors Parameter estimates
(parameter name) t = 16 t = 12 t = 11 t = 8
(continued)
Average elasticity of market share to the 4:341 7:717 13:879 9:876
Underwriting Spread (1:939) (3:490) (6:296) (4:722)
Median elasticity of market share to the Underwriting Spread 4:666 8:260 15:061 10:751
Number of predicted inelastic demands 18 10 7 3
Number of observations 332 261 250 177
R-squared 0:354 0:369 0:304 0:290
F-statistic 113:19¤¤¤ 41:71¤¤¤ 55:23¤¤¤ 10:19¤¤¤
The sample includes all o¤erings of equity-linked and derivative securities between 1985 and 2001. The parameters
of a theoretical logit demand model are obtained using an Instrumental Variables estimator. The standard errors
are obtained using a Huber-White covariance estimator, robust for heteroskedasticity and within-security
correlation. They are shown below the estimate, in parenthesis. Estimates followed by ¤¤¤ are signi…cant to the 0.01
level, by ¤¤ to the 0.05 level, and by ¤ to the 0.1 level. Each observation consists of the market share of a bank’s
variety of a given security at a given time period, associated with the characteristics of the security and the banker,
in the same period, and their instruments. The sample time span has been split in 16,12,11 and 8 periods.
a Equals one when the underwriter is the innovator of that security.
b A dummy for each one of the 10 categories. Equals one when the security belongs to that category.
c A dummy for each one of the 12 periods. Equals one when the observation corresponds to that period.
d Test of Over-identi…ed Restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly speci…ed and that the
instruments over-identify the variation in the endogenous regressor. The p-value is shown below the Â2 statistic.
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Figure 1: Principal Underwritten Using Tax-Deductible Preferred Products
72
91-II 91-IV 92-II 92-IV 93-II 93-IV 94-II 94-IV 95-II 95-IV 96-II 96-IV 97-II 97-IV
98-II 98-IV 99-II 99-IV
00-II 00-IV
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
U
S
 $
 M
il
li
o
n
s
Quarters
PERCs
STRYPES PEPS
DECS
Figure 2: Principal Underwritten Using Convertible Preferred Products
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Figure 3: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using PERCS (1st generation)
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Figure 4: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using DECS (3rd generation)
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Figure 5: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using Trust-Originated Convertible Preferreds (14th
generation)
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Figure 6: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using PERLS (1st generation)
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Figure 7: Cumulative Principal Underwritten, by banks, using SMART Notes (4th generation)
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Figure 8: The decision tree of an issuer of a corporate security. The issuer chooses a variety, which is given
by a pair of a security type and a banker.
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Figure 9: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations (nested logit demand; t = 8)
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Figure 10: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations (nested logit; t = 11)
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Figure 11: Estimated Advantage of the Innovator over Time and Generations (nested logit; t = 12)
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Figure 12: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations (nested logit; t = 16)
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Figure 13: Estimated Advantage to the Innovator over Time and Generations (nested logit with issuer
heterogeneity; t = 8)
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